


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ATTACHMENT A

City of Wonsan and the Position of the Two Shipyard Areas



# INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO. 25X1

COUNTRY Korea

DATE DISTR. 17 AUG 51

SUBJECT Conduct of the North Korean Army in Seoul

NO. OF PAGES 3

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1. During the Communist occupation of Seoul from 4 January to 15 March 1951, the Chinese Communist troops never directly harmed or molested the population, but the North Korean forces and their rear echelon workers conducted themselves in the same way they had during their occupation in 1950. Their first move was to boast that Chinese Communist troops were approaching Taegu and Pusan and were annihilating the United Nations forces.
2. On 24 February, members of neighborhood people's committees in Seoul were all mobilized and sent, accompanied by North Korean soldiers, to make house-to-house calls in their respective territories. Their message was that all residents must leave Seoul for one of the four refugee areas: Pochon (127-13, 37-54), Tongduchon (127-04, 37-56), Munsan (126-43, 37-52), or Changdan (126-46, 37-56). There the authorities would be awaiting them with housing and food. On 26 February, people's committee members and soldiers made a second round, warning all Seoul residents to leave the city by 4:00 p.m. on 28 February at the latest. They intimated that anyone remaining in Seoul would be considered a traitor and dealt with accordingly by Chinese Communist troops or North Korean partisans.
3. Many of the frightened citizens went to their neighborhood people's committee offices and obtained certificates as refugees, then hid in other parts of the city to make officials believe they had fled. One resident who had acquaintances in the local State Security Bureau inquired there about the evacuation. The Bureau officials stated that they knew nothing about the matter and told the inquirer that claims that Chinese Communists or partisans would kill persons who did not leave the city were all reactionary propaganda, since neither Chinese nor partisans ever harmed honest citizens. On 28 February, however, soldiers and people's committee officials visited each house for the third time, shouting that Seoul would soon become a sea of fire and that those who did not leave would have no time for regrets later.
4. Persons who applied to the people's committees were issued refugee certificates in forms similar to the following:

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## Written Promise

Name:

Sex:

Age:

Address

I hereby promise to leave Seoul for a safe area with my family of \_\_\_\_\_ by \_\_\_\_\_ March at the latest.

10 March 1951

I hereby testify to the above.

SIN Yong-hwan (신영환) (chcp)

Commander, 4 Battalion, Front Support Unit of Seoul

No. \_\_\_\_\_

Address: \_\_\_\_\_-dong, East Gate District

Name:

Age:

This is to certify that the above comrade and \_\_\_\_\_ others are being dispersed from Seoul.

\_\_\_\_\_ 1951

NO Chae-hyong (노재형)

Chairman, Residents Dispersion Committee, East Gate District, Seoul

5. On 2 March, army and civilian representatives began a house-to-house search. In some areas of Chongno District, search parties included North Korean soldiers, officials of the neighborhood people's committee, members of the Internal Affairs Office, and political workers; they might have eight persons. Searches were very thorough, and anyone in the house was questioned as to whether any young men or women were living there. Young persons often hid themselves in empty houses or caves to avoid the search parties. After the main search, three members of the Internal Affairs Office sometimes searched again and removed clothing, bicycles, and other articles from the houses.
6. By 8 March, neighborhood people's committees had closed their offices and prepared everything for evacuation of the city. On 10 March, the North Korean army military police mobilized its entire force to comb the city and arrest all persons under the age of 45.\* Persons arrested were assembled in the compounds used by political units and questioned; all persons between 13 and 35 were kept, regardless of their backgrounds. On the nights of 10 and 11 March, they

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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were sent north under the escort of North Korean troops. Soldiers and members of the State Security Bureau in Seoul intimated that the young men were being taken to Pyongyang for ultimate dispatch to Manchuria to undergo Communist training.

7. When the North Koreans were evacuating Seoul, they tried to force the entire population to accompany them and leave no one in the city. The Seoul residents resisted, however, and refused to leave.
8. From the middle of February, when retreating Chinese Communist troops could be seen passing through Seoul every night, North Korean soldiers explained that the retreat was a strategic move aimed at encircling and annihilating United Nations forces. One North Korean soldier told a friend that, according to his commanding officer, over a hundred thousand American and South Korean prisoners of war had been taken and that both Taegu and Pusan were completely encircled. Other examples of propaganda repeated by North Korean soldiers showed them to be ignorant of the progress of the war and to accept as truth anything their commanders told them and retell it to the civilian population.

9. A North Korean military communique issued in Seoul is an example:

People's Army GHQ Communique - 12 February 1951

1. Yongwol (128-28, 37-10), Pyongchang (128-24, 37-22), and Chongson (128-40, 37-22) were liberated by our partisan units: 1,035 enemy killed and 227 taken prisoner.
2. In Wonju area, our People's Army units annihilated the 2 Regiment 2 Division of the U.S. Army and the 6 Division of the puppet army and took over 1,000 prisoners of war.
3. In the vicinity of Seoul, over 200 enemy tanks were either destroyed or taken. As a result, the enemy plan to invade Seoul was completely foiled.

14 February

Agitation-Propaganda Department of the Chongno District Party Branch.

25X1   Comment. No lower age limit for arrests was stated, but presumably young children were not included.

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